This is a composite of 196 photomicrographic images of George Washington's portrait on the 1$ bill. My program kept acting up and the quality is rather poor, but I decided to upload it anyway (since I spent way too much time on it). I have purposely painted out everything except the actual portrait and its frame. Ni...
This photograph was constructed from 1,800 individual photographs using a new prototype macro photography robotic system. The technology combines focus stacking, stitching, and a robotic photo rig to create each gigapixel macro photograph. We look forward to developing collaborations and partnerships that will help us ...
20 dollar bill macro
28 U. dollar is an example of fiat money. What is fiat money? Fiat money is a government- issued currency that is not backed by a commodity such as gold. Fiat money gives central banks greater control over the economy because they can control how much money is printed. Most modern paper currencies , such as the U. dollar, are fiat currencies.
Inflationary pressure and fear of a global recession have driven investors away from riskier assets. By seeking shelter in cash positions, mainly in the dollar itself, this protective movement has caused the U.S. Treasuries' 5-year yield to reach 3.38%, nearing its highest level in 15 years. By demanding a loftier premium to hold government debt, investors are signaling a lack of confidence in the current inflation controls.
A food dollar represents a $1 expenditure on domestically produced food by U.S. consumers. The food dollar is allocated to expenditures on each of the various food commodities sold in proportions that represent their share of annual sales in the U.S. market. See the Food Prices, Expenditures, and Establishments page for information on total U.S. food expenditures and U.S. Agricultural Trade for information on the import share of domestic food expenditures.
Value Added Component Series: For establishments contributing to the U.S. food supply, value added for an establishment equals the proceeds from the sale of outputs minus the outlays for commodities purchased from other establishments. The sum of value added by all establishments that contribute to total food dollar purchases equals $1. The industry group and primary factor series are based on this value-added concept.
For calendar year 2021, farm production value added was 7.4 cents of each food dollar expenditure, implying that 7.1 cents from farm commodity sales (from the 14.5-cent farm share) was used to purchase products from the other industry groups. The 2021 industry group, value added food dollar also indicates about 46.3 cents of the food dollar value cover the services from food retailers (12.7 cents) and foodservice establishments (33.6 cents). Energy used throughout the food supply chain accounted for 3.2 cents of every 2021 food dollar expenditure. Advertising accounted for 3.0 cents of a food dollar expenditure.
Primary factors are assets employed by establishments to use or transform products purchased from other establishments (intermediate inputs) to produce and market a different product. These assets add market value to the purchased intermediate products. In the food dollar accounts, value added is recorded as income to primary factors as follows:
For calendar year 2021, the primary factor series indicates 50.3 cents of every food dollar expenditure go to the salary and benefits of domestic workers, 39.4 cents is dispensed as property income, and the remainder is split between U.S. Government (output taxes) and international assets (imports).
Cross-tabulated statistics of primary factor value added data by industry groups are displayed in table form because these data provide more detail than can effectively be displayed in a food dollar visual. The underlying detailed value-added data for 2021 are presented below:
Using conventional IO analysis, the annual marketing bill series is estimated for all available years from 1993 to 2021. The current data for 2013 to 2021 are preliminary and subject to revision when the next detailed U.S. benchmark IO accounts are released. The real (inflation-adjusted) 2021 data are also available.
Supply chain IO analysis is used to determine where food dollars end up (as income) by tracing the market value added measures for 12 supply chain industry groups (Industry group Food Dollar Series) and for primary production factors (Primary factor Food Dollar Series). All estimates are reported in both nominal (current price) and real (inflation-adjusted) dollars.
The government announced social mitigation packages that include widening coverage of the Takaful and Karama cash transfer programs, hikes to pensions and public sector wages, and tax measures, among other actions to alleviate the impact of rising prices. Moreover, Egypt requested International Monetary Fund (IMF) support to implement a comprehensive economic program to address the negative spillovers from global economic conditions and the war in Ukraine, restore macro-fiscal stability and anchor the structural reform program.
Figure 1: Estimated spending and tax revenue reductions, per fiscal year, embodied in HR 1 Senate version. Shaded areas pertain to spending occurring outside of the 20 month time frame. Source: CBO, Cost Estimate of amendments in the nature of a substitute by Senator Reid for Senators Nelson and Collins to HR 1 (February 9, 2009).Figure 2: Estimated spending and tax revenue reductions, per fiscal year, embodied in HR 1 House version. Shaded areas pertain to spending occurring outside of the 20 month time frame. Source: CBO, Cost Estimate of HR 1 (January 27, 2009).The vertical axes in Figures 1 and 2 have been made conformable. What is clear is that in the Senate compromise version, (1) the green portion (tax provisions, approximately) of the bars is bigger, and (2) a larger proportion of spending takes place in the next 20 months. Is that a good thing? In combination, no. What will happen is that there will be more tax cuts that expand the already increasing deficit but will have minimal impact on aggregate demand; and less spending on things that will have a maximal impact on aggregate demand. (By the way, throwing in big tax cuts that have minimal effect on aggregate demand makes it more likely that one gets fiscal policy ineffectiveness, as shown in Case 3 in this post.) Figure 3 shows the relative costs of each bill normalized by GDP.
The Fed has not idled in wait of potential new flare-ups. Since our last update on Fed policy dynamics, it has rolled out more repo operations and added 42-day calendar repos to help provide funding over the year-end turn. These operations have seen nearly double the amount of submissions versus the offering size of $25 billion each. This demonstrates that primary dealers aren't taking any chances either.
In addition to daily and term repo operations, the Fed has purchased over $100 billion T-bills for its SOMA portfolio since October. These so-called 'not QE' asset purchases, along with the repo operations, have led to the Fed's balance-sheet growing at a faster clip than that experienced in the first twelve weeks of QE2 and QE3 (Chart 1). Luckily it's not QE though, right?
As of November's last week, the Fed's balance sheet has grown in size by nearly $300 billion since the repo flare-up. This speed goes to prove a concept well known in the marketplace: the Fed tightens slowly and eases quickly. In less than three months the Fed unwound basically half of QT.
Now, it's not that simple and there is overlap with the Treasury bill purchases which are producing more permanent excess reserves. Nonetheless, the amount of Fed repos nearly matches the growth in TGA. If the Fed had not expanded, its balance sheet there would have been more reserve draining because UST issuance would have mopped up cash needed to restock the TGA. Meanwhile, FCBs have pulled some money from the Fed and are providing relief by reducing their F-RRP allocation.
So back to our main concern: 2020. Assuming there isn't something more nefarious going on in the banking system by some point in early next year, Fed repo assets should decline in size. That said, the handoff from temporary liquidity to 'not QE' T-bill purchases may end up being more abrupt than risk markets are comfortable with.
Case in point: as seen in Chart 3, in the months after the initial spike due to Lehman, some of the Fed's temporary liquidity programs started to see less usage as the panic subsided. This led to actual reserve declines as QE1 took some time to replace them. On a smaller scale, there is risk of a similar sort of repeat in 1H20. For example, if repo usage dropped to normal levels (i.e. as they were used pre-crisis), repo assets at the Fed could drop by over $200 billion (it would take over three months to replace those reserves via Treasury bill purchases). 2ff7e9595c